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Abstract 
 
This study empirically investigates the extent of non compliance with the tax code and the 
determinants of federal income tax evasion in the U.S.  Employing the most recent data we find that 
18-19% of total reportable income is not properly reported to the IRS, giving rise to a “tax gap” 
approaching $500 billion dollars. Three time periods are studied, 1960-2008, 1970-2008, and 1980-
2008. It is found across study periods that income tax evasion is an increasing function of the 
average effective federal income tax rate, the unemployment rate, public dissatisfaction with 
government, and per capita real GDP (adopted as a measure of income), and a decreasing function 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (during its first two years of being implemented). Modest evidence 
of a negative impact of IRS audit rates on tax evasion is also detected.  
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Introduction  
 
Tax evasion effectively defrauds the government of legally due tax revenues, thereby 
reducing the government‟s ability to provide public services, while increasing the nation‟s debt 
burden. Noncompliance shifts real resources from honest taxpayers to dishonest evaders, and tax 
liabilities from present to future generations.  Such inequities precipitate greater discontent with the 
government and further erode public revenues.  In light of these consequences, economists strive to 
estimate the magnitude, composition, growth and determinants of tax evasion in the hope of 
implementing public polices likely to improve fiscal compliance.  
In the U.S., noncompliance with the income tax is accomplished by underreporting taxable 
income and/or overstating allowable deductions. Since tax evasion is a punishable illegal behavior 
that individuals attempt to hide, measuring the magnitude of tax evasion and how it changes over 
time is a difficult and elusive task. The purpose of this study is to present new time series estimates 
of tax evasion in the US and then to use these estimates to analyze the determinants of income tax 
evasion. 
 The rich theoretical literature on tax evasion [Allingham & Sandmo (1972),  Yitzhaki 
(1974),  Falkinger (1988), Klepper, Nagin, & Spurr (1991), Das-Gupta (1994), Pestieau, Possen, & 
Slutsky (1994), Caballe & Panades (1997), Sandmo (2005) and Gahramanov (2009)] has been 
comprehensively reviewed and analyzed by Cowell (1990), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 
(1998), Alm (1999),  Franzoni (1999)  and Slemrod (2007). The literature‟s theoretical models are 
inventive and mathematically elegant and endeavor to identify variables that are likely to affect tax 
compliance behavior.  However, the plethora of behavioral assumptions and alternative model 
specifications often yield conflicting results regarding the expected signs and magnitudes of many 
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of the key variables believed to effect tax evasion. These theoretical ambiguities underscore the 
need for further empirical analysis to examine the determinants of tax evasion. The specific aim of 
the current study is to estimate how tax evasion in the U.S. has changed over time and to analyze the 
determinants of noncompliance behavior. 
  
l. Measuring Tax Evasion 
 The first problem encountered in any empirical attempt to analyze the determinants of tax 
evasion is to define and estimate an appropriate measure of noncompliance. Measuring a 
behavior that individuals attempt to hide is inherently one of the more challenging problems 
faced by social scientists. Social scientists therefore rely on both direct and indirect approaches 
for measuring what is commonly referred to as the “underground economy.” 
  Andreoni, Erard, Feinstein (1998, p.836) claim that” the most reliable information about 
noncompliance is based on actual tax return information that has been thoroughly examined by 
auditors” as part of the IRS Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) which 
attempts to measure “unreported income” and the national “tax gap”.3  However, the last TCMP 
undertaken by the IRS was for the tax year 1988 since these “audits from hell” were deemed to 
be overly intrusive.  A less intrusive substitute for TCMP known as the National Research 
Program (NPR) was instituted in the 1990‟s to estimate non compliance.  Slemrod (2007, p.26) 
contends that these estimates represent “the most careful and comprehensive estimates of the 
extent and nature of tax noncompliance anywhere in the world”. However, as noted by Toder 
(2010) “there are some serious „gaps‟ in the tax gap measure and these introduce substantial 
uncertainty into the measure.” The last IRS estimate of the U.S. tax gap was undertaken for the 
year 2001 and amounted to $345 billion dollars. In what follows, we employ estimates of 
unreported income from the 1988 TCMP and the 2001 NPR as direct “benchmark” 
approximations of the level of noncompliance for the respective years. These benchmarks are 
then incorporated into a version of Feige‟s (1989) general currency ratio model (GCM).  
Currency ratio models are the most common indirect method for estimating changes in tax 
evasion over time.  
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Our goal is to generate a time series estimate of the relative size of the fiscal 
underground economy, (the “unreported economy”) as measured by the ratio of unreported 
income (Yu) to reported income (Yo).
 4
 Unreported income is the difference between the amount 
of income that should be reported to the tax authority (under full compliance with the tax code) 
and the amount actually reported, namely, adjusted gross income (AGI). The most common 
method for estimating the relative size of the unreported economy (Yu/Yo) relies on some variant 
of the general currency ratio model described in Feige (1989).  
 The most restrictive specification of the general currency ratio model [Cagan (1958), 
Gutmann (1977)] assumes that currency is the exclusive medium of exchange for unreported 
transactions, that the ratio of currency to checkable deposits remains constant except for changes 
induced by the growth of unreported income and that the amount of unreported income produced 
by a dollar of currency transacted in the unreported sector is the same as the amount of reported 
income produced by a dollar of currency transacted in the reported economy. In order to obtain a 
benchmark estimate of the size of the unreported sector, the restrictive model assumes that in 
some benchmark year (typically 1940) the underground economy (unreported income) was zero.
5
 
 In the analysis that follows, we relax the restrictive model with several important 
modifications. Since our concern is with estimating the amount of unreported income in the U.S., 
the first modification is to employ estimates of currency in circulation domestically (Cdom) rather 
than the total amount of currency in circulation (C). Despite widespread predictions of the advent 
of a “cashless society,” U.S. currency in circulation with the public amounted to more than 
$2,900 per capita by the end of 2010.  But American households and businesses admit to holding 
only 15% of this currency. Some fraction of U.S. currency is held abroad (the dollarization 
hypothesis) and some fraction is held domestically as a store of value and a medium of exchange 
for transactions involving the production and distribution of illegal goods and services (which 
are nevertheless taxable) and for transactions involving income that is not reported to the tax 
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authority,(the underground economy hypothesis). Feige‟s (2009) study of overseas currency 
concludes that between 30% and 36% of America‟s currency is currently held abroad, and his 
new temporal estimates of overseas holdings are used to generate a time series of domestic 
currency which is employed in the present study. 
The second refinement of the currency ratio model involves taking account of the 
technological innovations in the financial industry that significantly reduced the volume of 
“checkable deposits” (D) in the mid 1990‟s.6 During this period, banks began to offer retail 
sweep programs, in which checkable deposits were swept into money market deposit accounts, 
enabling banks to profitably reduce the level of demand deposits subject to reserve requirements. 
During the first quarter of 1994 these “sweeps” amounted to only $7.5 billion dollars but have 
subsequently increased to $775 billion in 2008. By adjusting for these “sweeps” in our definition 
of “checkable deposits,” we take account of an important factor affecting the conventional C/D 
ratio which is unrelated to developments in the unreported economy.  
 Figure 1 displays the effects of these two adjustments by comparing the conventional 
C/D ratio employed in many published estimates of the underground economy with the new C/D 
ratio adjusted here for both domestic currency holdings and sweeps. 
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A further modification of the conventional currency ratio model is to drop the assumption 
that unreported income in 1940 was zero and instead employ an IRS benchmark estimate of 
unreported income for a year in which an independent estimate of the ratio Yut/Yot =αt is 
available.
7
  Two benchmark years were chosen, the 1988 TCMP estimate
8
 and 2001 NPR based 
estimate. For the year 1988, the ratio of legal unreported income to total reported taxable income 
was 18.8 percent, whereas the ratio of legal unreported income to adjusted gross income was 
14.5 percent. Our 1988 benchmark estimate for Yu/Yo is 16.7 percent, where Yu represents legal 
plus illegal unreported income and Yo represents AGI. We regard this as a lower bound estimate 
since the IRS acknowledges that “despite the intensity of the TCMP examinations, some income 
still goes undetected.”9  
 The most recent year for which the IRS published a “tax gap”10 estimate was 2001. The 
gross tax gap was estimated to be $345 billion dollars.
11
 In order to construct a benchmark 
estimate of Yu/Yo for 2001, we first divide the IRS tax gap estimate by the average marginal 
federal income tax rate from the NBER TAXSIM model in order to obtain an estimate of total 
unreported income (Yu).  We then divide (Yu) by actual AGI (Yo) in order to obtain the 
benchmark estimate Yu/Yo for the year 2001. This benchmark underestimates the true value of 
Yu/Yo because the IRS tax gap excludes unpaid taxes on illegal income, and hence the 
unreported illegal income that we consider to be part of Yu.  
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Figure 2 displays the adjusted currency model‟s time series estimates of the ratio of 
unreported income to reported income (AGI) based on the IRS benchmarks for 1988 and 2001 
respectively. The percentage of unreported income rose dramatically during World War II, 
declined during the post war period and then remained roughly stable until 1973, when it again 
rose to a temporary peak in 1982. The 1980‟s and 1990‟s displayed considerable fluctuations in 
the Yu/Yo ratio which Cebula (1997) and Cebula et. al. (1998) showed could be explained by 
variations in tax rates, the public‟s dissatisfaction with government, and audit rates. During the 
past decade, the percentage of unreported income increased substantially, approaching the peak 
levels attained during the World War II period. By 2008 unreported income as a percent of AGI 
is estimated to range between 22 and 24 percent. These figures suggest a noncompliance ratio 
between 18-19 percent of total reportable income. 
 The implications for the estimated tax gap over the past four decades are displayed in 
Figure 3, which also includes the available IRS tax gap estimates. Since 2001, the tax gap 
appears to have increased dramatically, and by 2007 the gap peaked in the $450 - $490 billion 
dollar range.
12
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 It should be noted that our estimate of both unreported income and the tax gap are based 
exclusively on the use of domestic currency in unreported activities. Recent attention has been 
focused on an additional tax gap resulting from income earned abroad in tax havens. Although 
we cannot trace the source of estimates of overseas tax haven evasion, figures as high as $100 
billion have been mentioned in the press. Taking account of the tax gap resulting from overseas 
tax havens, overall tax evasion may cost the U.S. government as much $600 billion per year.  
 
2. A Model of the Determinants of Non Compliance 
 
Given our empirical estimates of the temporal path of the unreported economy, we now 
specify a model of noncompliance which we will estimate empirically.  In this study, the relative 
probability that the representative economic agent will not report his/her taxable income to the IRS 
is treated as an increasing function of the expected gross benefits to the agent of not reporting 
income, eb, and as a decreasing function of the expected gross costs to the agent of not reporting 
income, ec. Thus, the ratio of the probability of not reporting income to the IRS, pnr, to the 
probability of reporting income to the IRS, (1-pnr), is described for the representative economic 
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agent by: 
 
(1) pnr/(1-pnr) = f(eb, ec), feb > 0, fec < 0        
 
Expressing probabilities in relative terms such as shown in equation (1) possesses the virtue that it 
reflects the form of the tax evasion data described above in Section 1, namely as the ratio of 
unreported to reported income.  
Following Cagan (1958), Bawley (1982), Tanzi (1982), Clotfelter (1983), and Feige (1994), 
the gross expected benefits from not reporting income to the IRS are hypothesized to be an 
increasing function of the federal income tax rate. To reflect the federal income tax rate, most 
previous studies using official data for the U.S. have adopted either of two alternative measures: an 
average effective federal income tax rate (AET) or the maximum marginal federal income tax rate 
(MAXT). In this study, the AET measure of the income tax rate is adopted because, as argued in 
Feige (1994), this tax rate is likely to be a more representative measure of the income tax rate for a 
larger portion of the taxpaying public than MAXT would be. Accordingly, it is hypothesized, ceteris 
paribus, that: 
 
(2) eb = g(AET), gAET > 0         
 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) may have been perceived by at least some portion of 
the general public as an honest, good faith effort to reform, i.e., to simplify and increase the equity 
of the Internal Revenue Code. As Musgrave observed (1987, p. 59), “The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
is the most sweeping reform since the early 1940s…” Indeed, the TRA did introduce a number of 
reforms, many of which are outlined in broad terms in Barth (1991), Barth and Brumbaugh (1992), 
Ott and Vegari (2003), and Sanger, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1990). For example, as observed in Ott 
and Vegari (2003, p. 279), “The Act introduced major cuts in the personal tax rate. When fully 
effective (1988) only two tax brackets set at 15 and 28 percent were to replace the 14 bracket tax 
schedule with rates in the range of 11 to 50 percent...[while it] broadened the tax base by reducing 
the itemized deduction.” Musgrave (1987, p. 59) further observes that prior to the TRA, a slow 
erosion of the income tax base had been occurring. Musgrave (1987, p. 57) was particularly 
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dismayed by the widening of tax loopholes and the emergence of high income tax shelters that had 
“…gained momentum in recent years and undermined the public‟s faith in the income tax. “ In this 
vein, Barth (1991), Barth and Brumbaugh (1992), and Sanger, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1990) 
describe how the TRA decreased depreciation benefits from financial investments in residential as 
well as commercial real estate, established limitations on the tax deductibility of losses from 
“passive” investments that affected limited partnership syndications (including those involving real 
estate ventures), and terminated favorable capital gains treatment of real estate. Musgrave (1987, p. 
59) also expressed concern that the “…compounding of the investment tax credit and accelerated 
depreciation diluted and distorted the base of the corporate income tax.” Musgrave (1987, p. 59) 
asserted that the TRA “…reversed these trends, a major accomplishment that all reformers will 
welcome.” As Barth (1991, pp. 45, 124) observes, among other things, under the TRA the 10 
percent investment tax credit for the purchase of equipment was repealed, and the life of the 
investment was increased for depreciation purposes. Based on Musgrave‟s (1987) arguments, as 
well as findings for an earlier study period in Cebula, Coombs, and Yang (2009), then, it is expected 
in the present study that taxpayers might well have favorably regarded the TRA and been less 
resentful of the Internal Revenue Code than before, at least initially. Thus, it is hypothesized here 
that at the time the TRA was being enacted and becoming effective (1986-1987) and also received 
the greatest publicity, reduced taxpayer resentment of the federal income tax system/Internal 
Revenue Code would/could, at least temporarily, have resulted in a reduced degree of aggregate 
income tax evasion, ceteris paribus. The reason this reaction to the TRA might be only temporary is 
revealed in the words of Slemrod (1992, p. 45), who argues that it would take at least some time for 
taxpayers “…to learn about and adjust to the new law [the TRA].” Consequently, it is hypothesized 
here that, for the period when the TRA was first implemented, 1986, through the year the TRA 
became “de facto fully effective,” 1987 (Barth (1991); Barth and Brumbaugh (1992)), the eb was 
reduced, whether because of either reduced taxpayer resentment or simply because it would take at 
least some time for taxpayers to fully understand the newly modified IRS Code and how to “deal” 
with it. Accordingly, (2) above is replaced by (3): 
 
(3) eb= j(AET, TRA), jAET > 0, jTRA <0     
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Estimating with the TRA dummy variable (which can be regarded as a de facto control variable) so 
specified as to include years after 1988 renders this variable statistically insignificant, a finding 
consistent with arguments in Slemrod (1992,  p. 45), although the other findings in the model are 
not seriously affected by so specifying TRA. Accordingly, based our estimation results and the 
argument in Slemrod (1992, p. 45), it is argued here that TRA as specified above is the most useful 
form of this variable. 
 Next, as in Alm and Yunus (2009), it is expected that the higher the unemployment rate 
(UN), the greater the degree of aggregate income tax evasion, ceteris paribus. This expectation is 
based on the reasoning that the higher the UN level, the greater the extent to which the unemployed 
work in the “underground economy” and do not report income. Moreover, this effect may be 
reinforced to the extent that higher unemployment creates an incentive to engage in income tax 
evasion even for still-employed people to the degree that they try to covet extra funds (by under-
reporting income) in the event of a possible future lay-off. Furthermore, the higher the real income 
level (INC), the greater the degree to which tax evasion is hypothesized in this study to occur, 
ceteris paribus, because higher income persons will tend to have greater access to and greater 
knowledge of ways in which to reduce income tax liabilities. For example, many higher income 
persons report income on a Schedule C, which often-times provides an opportunity to under-report 
income (Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett, 2001). Higher income persons arguably also have greater access 
to specialized tax lawyers and accountants who may enable them to more efficiently “limit” tax 
liabilities. Thus, equation (3) can be replaced by equation (4), as follows: 
 
(4)   eb= j(AET, TRA, UN, INC), jAET > 0, jTRA <0, jUN > 0, jINC > 0 
 
Finally, following Feige (1994) and others, it can be argued that the greater the public‟s 
dissatisfaction with government (DIS), the greater the secondary gain from not reporting or from 
under-reporting taxable income, ceteris paribus. The variable DIS is the so-called public 
dissatisfaction with government index (based on survey questions from the University of Michigan 
Institute for Social Research, 2009). This variable measures: (a) the degree to which the public 
distrusts public officials (other than the President) to fulfill their job obligations; (b) the degree to 
which the public regards government officials as dishonest; and (c) the degree to which the public 
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believes that government officials waste tax dollars. The value of the index ranges from -1.5 to + 
1.5, with a higher index value signifying a greater degree of dissatisfaction with government. Thus, 
(4) is replaced by (5): 
 
(5) eb= j(AET, TRA, UN, INC, DIS), jAET > 0, jTRA <0, jUN > 0, jINC > 0, jDIS > 0 
 
The expected gross costs of not reporting income to the IRS are hypothesized to be an 
increasing function of the expected risks/costs thereof (Pestieau, Possen, and Slutsky, 1994; Erard 
and Feinstein, 1994; Caballe and Panades, 1997). In this study, to the representative economic 
agent, the expected risks/costs from not reporting or from underreporting taxable income to the IRS 
are enhanced by an increase in AUDIT, the percentage of filed federal income tax returns that is 
formally audited by IRS examiners/personnel, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the experience of an IRS tax 
audit could imply non-pecuniary ("psychic") costs as well as pecuniary costs (including outlays for 
legal or other representation, along with the value of one's own time) above and beyond any 
potential added taxes, penalties, and interest assessed by the IRS. This study adopts the probability 
of a formal audit as a measure of risk to the would-be tax evader. Thus, we have:  
 
(6) ec = j(AUDIT), jAUDIT > 0       
 
Substituting from (5) and (6) into (1) yields:  
 
(7) pnr/(1-pnr) = eb= j(AET, TRA, UN, INC, DIS, AUDIT) 
jAET > 0, jTRA <0, jUN > 0, jINC > 0, jDIS > 0, bAUDIT < 0    
  
Let AGI represent the actual total value of the aggregate federal adjusted gross income in 
the economy, i.e., AGI=UAGI+RAGI, where UAGI is the dollar size of the unreported aggregate 
federal adjusted gross income in the economy, and RAGI is the dollar size of the reported 
aggregate federal adjusted gross income in the economy. It reasonably follows overall that: 
 
(8) UAGI = (pnr)*AGI                    
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and 
 
 (9) RAGI = (1-pnr)*AGI           
 
It then follows that: 
 
(10) UAGI/RAGI = (pnr)*AGI/(1-pnr)*AGI = (pnr)/(1-pnr)     
 
From (7) and (10), substitution for pnr/(1-pnr) in (1) yields: 
 
(11) UAGI/RAGI = j(AET, TRA, UN, INC, DIS, AUDIT) 
jAET > 0, jTRA <0, jUN > 0, jINC > 0, jDIS > 0, bAUDIT < 0    
  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
Based on the framework provided in (11) above, the following reduced-form equation is to 
be estimated: 
 
(12) (UAGI/RAGI)t = a0 + a1 AETt-1 + a2 TRAt + a3 UNt-1 + a4 INCt-1 + a5 DISt-2  
+ a6 AUDITt-2 + u               
where:  
(UAGI/RAGI)t = the ratio of the aggregate unreported federal adjusted gross income in year t to 
the aggregate reported federal adjusted gross income in year t, expressed as a percent; 
a0 = constant term; 
AETt-1 = the average effective federal income tax rate in year t-1, expressed as a percent; 
TRAt= a binary (dummy) variable for the years 1986 and 1987:TRAt=1 for the years 1986, 1987 and 
TRAt =0 otherwise; 
UNt-1= percentage unemployment rate of the civilian labor force in year t-1;   
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INCt-1 = per capita real GDP in year t-1 (expressed in year 2000 dollars); 
DISt-2 = the mean value of the public dissatisfaction with government index, year t-2, with values 
lying between -1.5 and + 1.5; 
AUDITt-2 = the percentage of filed federal personal income tax returns in year t-2 that was subjected 
to a formal IRS audit involving IRS examiners; and 
u = stochastic error term.  
The initial study period runs from 1960 through 2008, reflecting availability of the tax 
evasion data. In the interest of testing for robustness and consistency of results, as well as in the 
quest for potential additional insights, two additional study periods are also considered: 1970-2008 
and 1980-2008. The data are annual. The data for AET were obtained from the Internal Revenue 
Service (2010, Table 6). The AUDIT data were obtained from the Government Accounting Office 
(1996: Table I.1), and the U.S. Census Bureau (1994: Table 519, 1998: Table 550, 1999: Table 556, 
2001: Table 546, 2010: Table 469). The TRA variable is a dummy variable; the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 was actually signed into law by President Reagan in October of 1986. The data for the 
variables UN and INC were obtained from the Council of Economic Advisors (2009, Tables B-42, 
B-41). The DIS data were obtained by the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research 
(2009).The series adopted to measure income tax evasion, in this case represented by the variable 
UAGI/RAGI = Yu/Yo were obtained from Feige (2009) as described in Section 1. For the interested 
reader, descriptive statistics for each of the variables in each of the three study periods are found in 
Table 1. 
The P-P (Phillips-Perron) and ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) unit root tests indicate that 
the variables UAGI/RAGI, INC, and DIS are stationary only in first differences, whereas the 
variables UN and AUDIT are stationary only in second differences. Finally, variable AET is 
stationary in levels. This stationarity pattern holds for all three study periods. The variables DIS and 
AUDIT are lagged two periods to adjust for multicollinearity. 
For the three OLS estimates of equation (12), the Newey-West heteroskedasticity correction 
is adopted. The findings of these estimations are provided in Table 2. In these estimates, all 18 of 
the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs. Furthermore, ten of these estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level, two are statistically significant at the 
2.5 percent level, and three are statistically significant at the five percent level. Only the coefficients 
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for the AUDIT variable fail to be statistically significant at the five percent level, although all three 
of these coefficients exhibit the expected negative sign and are statistically significant at 
approximately the ten percent level. 
According to the results provided in Table 2, the coefficient on the  average effective federal 
income tax variable (AET) is positive in all three estimates and statistically significant for the overall 
study period (1960-2008) at beyond the five percent level and statistically significant at the one 
percent level for the two sub-periods (1970-2008 and 1980-2008). Thus, as expected, the higher the 
average effective federal income tax rate, the greater the expected benefits of tax evasion may be 
and hence the greater the extent of that income tax evasion. This finding is consistent with most 
previous studies of income tax evasion using official data [Ali, Ceceil and Knoblett, 2001; Cebula, 
2004; Clotfelter, 1983; Feige, 1994; Klepper, Nagin and Spurr, 1991; Tanzi, 1982, 1983]. 
Consistent with the arguments in Musgrave (1987) and findings in Cebula, Coombs, and 
Yang (2009), while reflecting the arguments in Slemrod (1992) in how the TRA dummy variable is 
specified, the results for all three study periods are compelling. In particular, all three estimated 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the one percent level; in addition, the 
magnitudes of the three coefficients are quite similar. In any case, in all three estimates, the 
implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is shown to have reduced federal personal income 
tax evasion in the U.S., albeit only briefly. Given the specification of TRA as applying to the short-
term period of just 1986 and 1987, these results would seem to confirm the argument by Slemrod 
(1992, p. 45), who argues that it would take at least some time for taxpayers “…to learn about and 
adjust to the new law [the TRA].” 
The estimated coefficients on the unemployment variable are all positive, as hypothesized, 
and statistically significant at beyond the five percent level in two cases (1960-2008 and 1980-2008) 
and statistically significant at the one percent level in one case (1970-2008). Thus, there is strong 
evidence that the higher the unemployment rate, the greater the extent of aggregate federal income 
tax evasion. This finding is compatible with the recent findings in Alm and Yunus (2009). 
Next, the estimated coefficients on the per capita real GDP variable (INC) are all positive, as 
hypothesized, with two being statistically significant at the one percent level (for the periods 1970-
2008 and 1980-2008) and one being statistically significant at the 2.5 percent level (for the period 
1960-2008). These findings appear to confirm our hypothesis that the degree of aggregate federal 
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personal income taxation is greater at higher levels of taxable income. In other words, the higher 
the real income level (INC), the greater the degree to which tax evasion is expected to occur, ceteris 
paribus, plausibly because higher income persons will tend to have greater access to and knowledge 
of ways in which to avoid income taxes. For example, many higher income persons report income 
on a Schedule C, which often-times provide an opportunity to under-report income or over-report 
expenses (Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett, 2001). In addition, higher income persons also may have greater 
access to specialized tax lawyers and accountants [as well, perhaps, as a former IRS agents] who 
may enlighten them as to how to more efficiently both avoid and evade tax liabilities.  
The estimated coefficients on the public dissatisfaction with government variable, DIS, are 
all positive, as expected, with two statistically significant at the one percent level (for 1970-2008 
and 1980-2008) and one significant at the 2.5 percent level (1960-2008). Thus, as suggested by 
Feige (1994), it appears that the greater the degree to which the public is dissatisfied with 
government, the greater the secondary gains from income tax evasion and the greater the actual 
aggregate degree of income tax evasion.  
Finally, there is the audit variable. In all three estimates it exhibits the expected negative 
sign; however, in all three estimates it fails to be statistically significant at the five percent level. 
Indeed, these three coefficients are statistically significant at barely the ten percent level. Thus, it 
appears that the audit rate (AUDIT) variable, of and in itself, may not be viewed as a strong 
deterrent to federal personal income taxation. This finding is consistent with previous studies such 
as Cebula (2001), who suggests that IRS penalties and interest charges, as well as improving 
income-detection technology, are more important tax-evasion disincentives. Unfortunately, 
dependable official data on the latter two factors are unavailable for the entirety of the study periods 
considered in this study. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
 This empirical study employs a modified version of Feige‟s (1989) general currency ratio 
model (GCM)  to obtain a time series estimate of income tax evasion in the U.S. from 1940- 2008. 
The modifications address three germane critiques of the commonly used currency ratio models. 
First, the model typically requires arbitrarily choosing of a year in which the “underground 
economy” or tax evasion was nonexistent.  Second, the model typically employs aggregate currency 
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holdings although it is understood that only domestic currency holdings are relevant for domestic 
tax evasion behavior. This critique is particularly pertinent for the U.S. since the dollar is known to 
be an internationally held currency.  Finally, as pointed out by Garcia (1978), the model typically 
assumes that the ratio of currency to demand deposits is affected only by changes in tax evasion 
whereas financial innovations independent of noncompliance behaviors can significantly reduce 
demand deposit holdings and hence affect the currency ratio.  
  The modified currency ratio model relaxes each of the forgoing restrictions in order to 
obtain an aggregate time series estimate of the ratio (Yu/Yo) of unreported income (Yu) to reported 
income (Yo =AGI) as well as an estimate of the U.S. tax gap. First, we drop the common 
assumption that in some particular year (typically 1940) tax evasion was zero and instead employ 
what are regarded to be the best available benchmark estimates of tax evasion.  These are the TCMP 
based IRS estimate for the year 1988 and the more recent 2005 NPR based IRS estimate. Second, 
instead of assuming that the temporal pattern of evasion is directly related to the ratio of aggregate 
currency to demand deposits, we take account of Feige‟s (2009) new estimates of overseas dollar 
holdings and derive estimates of the temporal pattern of domestic U.S. currency holdings. Finally, 
we take into account financial innovations (sweep accounts) that affect the size of demand deposit 
holdings over time independent of changes in noncompliance behavior. Employing the ratio of 
domestic currency holdings to demand deposits adjusted for the innovation of sweep accounts and 
anchoring evasion estimates to highly respected IRS benchmarks leads to improved estimates of tax 
evasion over time. 
The new estimates of noncompliance suggest that between 18-19 percent of total reportable 
income is not properly reported to the IRS. The estimated $2 trillion of unreported income gives rise 
to an annual tax gap of $450-500 billion. These estimates are then employed in conjunction with 
variables believed to affect noncompliance behaviors to investigate the determinants of federal tax 
evasion behavior in the U.S. for the time period 1960-2008, as well as two sub-periods thereof, 
1970-2008 and 1980-2008. The principal conclusions include the following: federal income tax 
evasion is an increasing function of the average effective federal income tax rate, the percentage 
unemployment rate of the civilian labor force, per capita real GDP, and the public‟s dissatisfaction 
with government. The study also finds that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 acted to briefly 
discourage/diminish aggregate personal income tax evasion, whereas the IRS audit rate may have 
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modestly acted to discourage that tax evasion, although this finding is un-compelling in all three of 
the estimates.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   Mean  Standard Deviation 
Period: 1960-2008: 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)    19.17  2.93 
AET    13.83  1.086 
TRA    0.0408  0.19999  
UN    5.856  1.401 
INC    25437  7326 
DIS    0.0361  0.969 
AUDIT    2.0529  1.458 
 
Period: 1970-2008: 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)    20.159  2.423 
AET    13.989  1.087 
TRA    0.0513  0.2235 
UN    6.132  1.35 
INC    27833  6180 
DIS    0.43  0.63 
AUDIT    1.362  0.54 
 
Period: 1980-2008: 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)   20.86  2.1414  
AET    13.934  1.21 
TRA    0.07  0.258  
UN    6.103  1.42 
INC    30353  5046 
DIS    0.387  0.651 
AUDIT    1.12  0.374 
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Table 2. Three Estimates (Dependent Variable: (∆UAGI/RAGI) 
Variable\Estimation 1960-2008  1970-2008  1980-2008   
a0   -3.61   -3.74   -4.135 
 
AET   0.236*   0.228***  0.2446*** 
   (2.18)   (2.96)   (3.05) 
 
TRA   -3.22***  -2.91***  -3.02*** 
   (-11.82)  (-11.57)  (-9.07) 
 
∆∆UN   0.289*   0.338***  0.426* 
   (2.06)   (2.98)   (2.35) 
 
∆INC   0.00122**  0.00166***  0.00195*** 
   (2.48)   (3.61)   (3.95) 
 
∆DIS   0.951**  1.529***  1.392*** 
   (2.42)   (3.71)   (2.90) 
 
∆∆AUDIT  -0.032#  -0.0828#  -0.0949#  
   (-1.68)   (-1.69)   (-1.75) 
 
R
2
   0.37   0.48   0.53 
AdjR
2
   0.27   0.38   0.40 
F   3.76***  4.84***  4.12*** 
DW   1.90   2.07   2.21 
Rho   0.05   -0.035   -0.11 
***indicates statistical significance at the one percent level; **indicates statistical significance at the 
2.5 percent level; *indicates statistical significance at the five percent level; # indicates statistically 
significant at the ten percent level. Terms in parentheses are t-values. ∆ is the first differences 
operator; and ∆∆ is the second differences operator. 
 
